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Abstract 
Open innovation is a powerful framework encompassing the generation, capture, and 
employment of intellectual property at the firm level. We identify three fundamental challenges 
for firms in applying the concept of open innovation: finding creative ways to exploit internal 
innovation, incorporating external innovation into internal development, and motivating 
outsiders to supply an ongoing stream of external innovations.  This latter challenge involves a 
paradox, why would firms spend money on R&D efforts if the results of these efforts are 
available to rival firms? 
To explore these challenges, we examine the activity of firms in open source software to 
support their innovation strategies.  Firms involved in open source software often make 
investments that will be shared with real and potential rivals.  We identify four strategies firms 
employ — pooled R&D/product development, spinouts, selling complements and attracting 
donated complements — and discuss how they address the three key challenges of open 
innovation.  We conclude with suggestions for how similar strategies may apply in other 
industries and offer some possible avenues for future research on open innovation. 
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Challenges of Open Innovation: 
The Paradox of Firm Investment in Open Source Software 
1. INTRODUCTION 
What challenges does an open innovation approach present to managers?  Interestingly, 
models of open innovation offer the promise that firms can achieve a greater return on their 
innovative activities and their intellectual property (IP) by loosening their control over both 
(Chesbrough, 2003a). Open innovation models stress the importance of using a broad range of 
knowledge sources for a firm’s innovation and invention activities, including customers, rivals, 
academics, and firms in unrelated industries while simultaneously using creative methods to 
exploit a firm’s IP. 
The open innovation paradigm is often contrasted to the traditional vertical integration or 
“proprietary” model where internal R&D activities lead to products that are developed and 
distributed by the firm (Chandler, 1990).  The way to manage this proprietary model was 
summed up by Harvard president James Bryant Conant as “picking a man of genius, giving him 
money, and leaving him alone” (Conant, 2002).  Of course, getting the ideas from the “man of 
genius” was only half the challenge, the other half was to exploit those innovations.  This 
exploitation is where the proprietary model frequently broke down.  For while some IP that 
couldn’t be internally commercialized was licensed to others, all too frequently it “sat on a shelf” 
waiting either for internal development, its research proponents to leave the firm to develop it on 
their own, or even more dangerously, for it to “spillover” to other firms (Smith and Alexander, 
1988; Chesbrough & Rosenbloom, 2002). 
We define open innovation as systematically encouraging and exploring a wide range of 
internal and external sources for innovation opportunities, consciously integrating that 
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exploration with firm capabilities and resources, and broadly exploiting those opportunities 
through multiple channels (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).  Therefore, the open innovation 
paradigm goes beyond just utilizing external sources of innovation such as customers, rivals, and 
universities (e.g. von Hippel, 1988) and is as much a change in the use, management, and 
employment of IP as it is in the technical and research driven generation of IP. 
As with other information goods, IP plays a crucial role in the software industry.  A growing 
segment of the software industry is open source software.  Open innovation may be an especially 
applicable framework for examining how firms have been able to exploit the opportunities 
provided by open source. Over the last 20 years collaboration between firms, suppliers and 
customers has produced open source products such as the Linux operating system, Firefox web 
browser, and the Apache web server.  Here we consider patterns of firm behavior towards open 
source software as an exemplar for more general forms of open innovation. 
Our research considers two questions. First, how do firms’ use of open source correspond to 
theories of open innovation? Second, we consider the paradox: why would firms contribute 
resources, including IP, to projects that will benefit others, including their competitors?  We are 
especially concerned with the strategies firms employ to help address three management 
challenges of open innovation - the maximization, incorporation, and motivation of IP - that we 
discuss in the next section. 
2. THE CHALLENGES OF THE OPEN INNOVATION PARADIGM 
In contrast to earlier models and “fully integrated innovators” like AT&T (now Lucent) Bell 
Labs and IBM which conduct basic research through commercial products, open innovation 
celebrates success stories like Cisco, Intel and Microsoft, which succeed by leveraging the basic 
research of others (Chesbrough, 2003a). Under this paradigm, internal innovation is 
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supplemented by systematic scanning for external knowledge, (facilitated by firm investments in 
absorptive capacity) with firms maximizing the returns that accrue from both sources (Table 1).  
Such strategies require firms to realign innovation strategies to extend beyond the boundaries of 
the firm, while creating mechanisms for appropriating value from the combined innovation.  
Based on our definition of open innovation, in practice the integration of internal and external 
innovation entails three challenge (Figure 1): 
• maximization. Firms need a wide range of approaches to maximize the returns to 
internal innovation — not just feeding the company’s product pipeline, but also 
outbound licensing of IP, patent pooling and even giving away technology to 
stimulate demand for other products. 
• incorporation. The existence of external knowledge provides no benefits to the firm if 
the firm cannot identify the relevant knowledge and incorporate it into its innovation 
activities. This requires scanning, absorptive capacity, and also the political 
willingness to incorporate external innovation. 
• motivation. Prior open innovation research assumes that external sources of 
innovation will arise.  To date this has clearly been true.  However, external sources 
of innovation are supplied by some person or entity.  How can firms work to insure 
that this stream of external innovation is replenished?  Why would firms contribute IP 
that was going to be made available to their rivals?  This last issue is the basis for our 
“paradox” of firm investments in open source software. 
<insert Table 1 about here> 
<insert Figure 1 about here> 
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2.1.1 Maximizing Returns to Internal Innovation 
A central concern to open innovation is how to best use the internal R&D capabilities of the 
firm to maximum advantage. Those capabilities can be used for 
• generating innovations to be internally commercialized (the proprietary model); 
• building absorptive capacity and using that capacity to identify external innovations; 
• generating innovations that generate returns through external commercialization (e.g. 
licensing patent portfolios); and 
• generating IP that does not produce direct economic benefit, but indirectly generates a 
return through spillovers or sale of related goods and products. 
Successful firms may combine a variety of these approaches. For example, to identify 
promising technologies Intel establishes research labs near elite university research groups, with 
open flows of information in both directions. If an innovation proves promising, to internalize 
the innovation Intel recruits the top academic researchers to help commercialize it and facilitate 
its production (Tennenhouse, 2003).  A cooperative example of multiple approaches is the GSM 
patent pool assembled by European telephone makers in the early 1990s. While the patents were 
often the result of basic research, contribution of a patent to the pool allowed firms to have 
favorable access to all of the IPR of the GSM standard, creating a cost advantage for European 
pool participants over potential Asian rivals (Bekkers et al, 2002). 
2.1.2 Incorporating External Innovations 
To benefit from external innovations, organizations need to identify such innovations, 
maintain the absorptive capacity to understand them, and be able to combine such spillovers with 
firm-specific internal innovation to produce a product tailored to the firm’s specific needs. 
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Even if external innovations are identified, that does not mean they will be incorporated into 
the firm’s product strategies. A firm that was once highly successful at the integrated innovation 
model will tend to believe its innovations superior to any competing ideas from outsiders. For 
example, flush from its successful user interface innovations of the 1980s, engineers at Apple 
Computer rejected external ideas in areas such as handheld computers, adopting the phrase “not 
invented here” to describe such rejection (Kaplan 1996: 156). 
2.1.3 Motivating Spillovers 
With external innovation, there is often an unstated assumption that the sources of external 
innovations will continue to produce them.  But what happens if everyone tries to be a “free 
rider” by only absorbing external innovations?  Will historic “innovation benefactors” — such as 
government and nonprofit research sponsors — continue to offer a plentiful supply (Chesbrough, 
2003b)?  If commercial firms do not realize a return on their innovative activities, they will tend 
to under-invest in innovative activities that are either highly risky (e.g. basic research) or that are 
easily imitated by free-riding competitors. Therefore, we consider the incentives for generating 
the knowledge spillovers at two levels: the individual and the organizational. 
Motivating individuals to generate and contribute their IP in the absence of financial returns 
is a management challenge for open innovation. One motivation model is expectancy theory, 
which posits that individuals are motivated by a combination of valence (the intrinsic or extrinsic 
attractiveness of a reward) and instrumentality (the path to that reward) (Lawler, 1971). The 
proprietary innovation model solved this challenge though extrinsic compensation coupled with 
adherence to traditional scientific norms. The external model relies upon intrinsic factors or 
others, e.g. universities, to partially or wholly provide the motivation for creating IP.  
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The incentives for organizations to contribute spillovers fall into two categories. In the one 
case, the innovation benefits the innovator and nothing is reduced by sharing that benefit. 
Customers often share their innovations with their vendors if it means improved products in the 
future (von Hippel, 1988). And of course suppliers invest in innovations to sell more products, as 
when Intel increases the performance of microprocessors that it sells to Dell. 
Spillovers to a direct competitor are more problematic, but still are economically rational 
under conditions of “co-opetition”. Firms in the same industry complement each other in creating 
markets but compete in dividing up markets (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1996: 34). So if a firm 
stands to benefit from an innovation that grows the market, it will accept spillovers if the return 
from its share of market growth is attractive enough. 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
These three management challenges led to three related research questions: 
• How do firms embrace open innovation approaches as part of their R&D efforts? 
• Why would firms commit their intellectual property and ongoing human resources to 
an effort that they know will benefit others, including competitors? 
• Why do individuals contribute their IP to a project that benefits firms without 
receiving financial remuneration? 
Because we are investigating relatively novel phenomena we focus on rich qualitative data to 
aid our theory building (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Eisenhardt, 1989).  Our research efforts 
included both primary and secondary sources.  From 2002 to 2004, one author conducted 47 
interviews with 41 informants representing 26 organizations, including 14 for-profit firms, 
spanning 8 major open source projects.  These interviews focused on the strategies of these 
organizations for selling or participating in open source software, and their motivations for doing 
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so. Most interviews ranged from 45-90 minutes, and most were tape recorded for later 
consultation. This was supplemented by participation in five Silicon Valley industry conferences 
and seminars from August 2003 through November 2004 focused solely on open source 
software.  These primary data sources were complemented by a secondary data review of 
approximately 800 news articles from trade journals, business press and websites related to open 
source topics. 
4. OPEN SOURCE AS OPEN INNOVATION 
Open source and related collaborative development techniques in the software industry 
provide evidence of how the three key challenges of open innovation have been addressed by 
commercial firms. Open source can also address what West (2003) refers to as an “essential 
tension” in information technology innovation: appropriating the returns from an innovation 
versus winning adoption of that innovation. Open source software is a great exemplar of open 
innovation because of the shared rights to use the resulting technology as well as the 
collaborative development of the technology. 
4.1 Prior Research on Open Source Software 
“Open source” software includes source code that can be modified and redistributed to 
others, while acknowledging the original author’s contribution (Perens 1999; Raymond 2004). 
The term encompasses a range of collaborative practices dating back to the 1970s, including 
university-based research on BSD Unix during the 1970s and the “free software” movement 
launched by Richard Stallman in 1984 (McKusick, 1999; Stallman, 1999).1  
                                                
1  However, the “free” software contains IP restrictions intended to force sharing of any derivative works, while 
other forms of “open” software (such as the Apache license) allow private commercialization of related 
innovations (West 2003). 
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Because “open source” refers to a specific set of software licenses approved by the non-profit 
Open Source Initiative, the term explicitly defines a particular subset of IP policies. However, it 
also often refers to a development methodology where geographically dispersed programmers 
collaborate to jointly produce software using virtual collaboration tools (West & O’Mahony, 
2005). While the first programmers were hobbyists, they have been joined today by a number of 
professionals paid by employers that either intend to use the software internally, or to sell related 
products and services. Virtual development has been facilitated by widespread dissemination of 
tools and the availability of the Internet, which have also enabled other forms of open 
innovation. One example is “gated source,” in which open source processes are used within a 
firm’s invitation-only group of software developers (Shah, 2003); another is PC game 
modifications (Scacchi, 2004). 
What motivates individuals to contribute to open source projects? Consistent with 
expectancy theory, empirical research (Hars and Ou, 2002; Hertel et al, 2003; Lakhani & von 
Hippel, 2003; Lerner and Tirole, 2002) found three classes of motivations: 
• direct utility, either to the individual or to one’s employer; 
• intrinsic benefit from the work, such as learning a skill or personal fulfillment; 
• signaling one’s capabilities to gain respect from one’s peers or interest from 
prospective employers. 
Meanwhile, firms have used hybrid strategies that combine the benefits of open source software 
with some of the control of proprietary approaches (West, 2003). 
Thus, open source as an open innovation strategy has two key components: shared rights to 
use the technology, and collaborative development of that technology using donated labor. From 
an analysis of major projects (Table 2), we identify four approaches for open innovation in open 
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source software — two driven by the structural relationship of contributor-participants, and two 
driven by the value proposition of a complex product. 
 
<insert Table 2 about here> 
4.2 Structural Approaches to Open Innovation 
One way to classify open innovation is through the structural relationship of the R&D 
contributors. To the traditional integrated approach of software development within the firm, 
open source offers two alternatives: pooled R&D and spinouts (Figure 2). These two approaches 
can be combined with each other, or with one of the product-oriented strategies given in Section 
4.3. 
<insert figure 2 about here> 
4.2.1 Pooled R&D or Product Development: Linux, Mozilla 
A noted instance of open innovation is that of pooled R&D or product development 
(Chesbrough, 2003a). While cooperative research often occurs to save costs, prior research also 
suggests that firms cooperate in cases where they cannot appropriate spillovers from their 
research (Ouchi and Bolton, 1988), in industries with strong vertical relationships (Sakakibara, 
2001) and in areas that are highly risky or for industries most dependent on advanced science 
(Miotti and Sachwald, 2003). Two highly visible open source examples are the Open Source 
Development Labs, and the Mozilla project. In both, firms donate IP to the open source project 
while exploiting the common benefits of all contributors to facilitate the sale of related products. 
A great example of pooled R&D is the Mozilla web browser project that was created by 
Netscape in 1998, in response to competitive pressures from Microsoft’s Internet Explorer. In 
July 2003, Netscape ended its sponsorship, deferring responsibility to the open source 
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community. Vendors such as IBM, HP and Sun needed a Unix based browser to help sell 
Internet-connected workstations, so each assigned software engineers to work with the Mozilla 
project, both to help keep the project moving forward and to assure that new releases were 
compatible with their respective systems (Dotzler, 2004). Today, this descendant of Netscape 
Navigator is available for a wide range of Unix systems, among others.  
A more complex and structured example is Linux-related development at the Open Source 
Development Labs (OSDL). While Linux began in 1991, the OSDL was founded in 2000, 
attracting a wide range of Linux-related providers of hardware, software and services. In its first 
five years, the consortium worked on three projects: data center Linux, carrier grade Linux and 
desktop Linux. 
How do these projects address the three open innovation challenges? For individuals and 
firms participating in Mozilla, the quid pro quo is straightforward: systems vendors maximize 
the returns of their innovation by concentrating on their own needs (e.g., platform-specific 
customization), and then distribute the shared browser technology with their integrated systems.   
For the OSDL, firms contribute specialized knowledge to build a common platform. OSDL 
resembles other self -supporting industrial research consortia, where firms pool interests towards 
a common goal, cooperating in supporting that goal and competing in selling their respective 
products.  It is similar to other I.T. consortia in the wide range of motivations represented by the 
members (Table 3). 
<insert Table 3 about here> 
However, both Mozilla and OSDL differ from typical consortia in two ways: 
• Spillovers are not controllable. Many consortia attract members by limiting direct 
access to the consortium’s research output to member-participants, reducing indirect 
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spillovers. Open source licenses typically make it impossible to limit even direct 
access, allowing non-members to accrue many of the same benefits as members. 
• Contributions from non-participants. Technical contributions to these projects extend 
beyond the sponsoring companies to include user organizations, academics, 
individual hobbyists and other interested parties. Unless the corporate contributions 
eventually dwarf the individual ones, the projects must continue to motivate such 
contributions to survive. 
These two differences highlight how an open source innovation model is inherently more 
“open” than a typical R&D consortium, both in terms of exploiting information from outside the 
consortium, and sharing that information back out to non-member organizations and individuals. 
4.2.2 Spinouts: Jikes, Eclipse, Beehive 
Open innovation can release the potential of IP within the firm that is not creating value. In 
some cases, the IP is no longer strategic, as when AOL Time Warner spun off Mozilla into a 
stand-alone open source project (Hansen, 2003).  But in addition to spin-off and abandonment, 
firms may also release more value from their technologies by situating them outside the firm, 
while at the same time maintaining an ongoing corporate involvement. Here we use “spinout” to 
refer to all cases where firms transform internal development projects to externally visible open 
source projects. 
If a firm is essentially giving away its IP, how can such spinouts create value? One way is 
that the donated IP generates demand for other products and services that the donor continues to 
sell (see also 4.3.1 Selling Complements). Two examples of this come from IBM and its efforts 
to promote the Java programming language developed by Sun Microsystems to compete with 
 12 
Microsoft. In a Java-centric world, IBM would still generate revenue from sales of hardware and 
supporting services. 
In response to IBM’s growing interest in Java, in early 1996 two IBM researchers began 
work on an experimental Java compiler, which they named “Jikes”. They quickly developed a 
prototype that was more efficient than Sun’s industry standard compiler. After customer requests 
for a better Java compiler, in December 1998 IBM released Jikes in open source form to allow 
external programmers to extend and improve it. IBM continues to host the project website, but 
since 2000 development has been led by non-IBM engineers (Gonsalves & Coffee, 1998; 
Shields, 2004). 
A second IBM spinout came with Java development tools. IBM created such tools for its 
WebSphere application server product, and then released much of this technology in open source 
form when it founded the Eclipse project in 2001. Other software companies involved in web 
application development as well as rival hardware makers joined Eclipse.  In 2004, the project 
became an independent non-profit corporation, although IBM engineers retained technical 
leadership of key projects. As an IBM executive later explained, “It is not that we are looking to 
make more money off the platform. It is just that we are looking to accelerate the adoption of 
Java and the building up of it for all of us” (Southwick, 2004). 
However, Java rivals BEA and Sun chose not to join IBM’s coalition, instead promoting the 
competing Java Tools Community. During 2004 BEA also created a “Beehive” open source 
project to release key application libraries from its WebLogic product for use with other 
development systems; it also helped a third party development of a “Pollinate” library to link 
Beehive with Eclipse. Finally, in March 2005 BEA officially joined the Eclipse project. By 2006, 
Eclipse had become the most vibrant open source community controlled by its vendor members; 
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the IBM spinout benefits both from IBM’s initial contribution of technology and also the pooled 
R&D investments of the current vendor-members. 
The spinout thus makes sense for technologies that either are not yet commercialized (as with 
Jikes), or that will eventually become commoditized and thus of limited commercial value (as 
many predicted for Java development tools). Both IBM and BEA donated internal innovations to 
create open source projects, in order to fuel adoption of related products. As with other 
organizations that sponsor open source projects, the benefits included: 
• helping establish their technology as de facto standards, which reduces the likelihood 
of having to re-implement other products to conform to competing standards; 
• attracting improvements and complements that make the technology more attractive; 
• together, the innovation and complements enable the sale of related products (e.g., 
WebSphere and WebLogic); and 
• generating mindshare and goodwill with the same audience that includes the potential 
customers for these related products. 
These motivations for open source spinouts are contrary to those of the oft-cited example of 
Xerox PARC, which spun out technologies that no longer aligned with Xerox’s strategy 
(Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002). Here firms relinquished control of key technologies — 
precisely because they were strategically aligned, and giving up control was an effective strategy 
to win adoption. 
4.3 Product-Centric Approaches 
Many innovations require a combination of goods and service to provide a “whole product 
solution” to buyers (Moore 1991). In computers and electronics, they often fall into what Katz & 
Shapiro (1985) term the “hardware-software paradigm.” As Teece (1986) notes, the base 
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innovation (“hardware”) requires an investment into producing complementary goods 
(“software”) specialized for that innovation, in order to make the entire system useful. 
In some cases, a system architecture will consist of various components — with mature 
components highly commoditized, while other pieces are more rapidly changing or otherwise 
difficult to imitate and thus offer opportunities for capturing economic value (West, 2003). In 
other cases, the complementary products are more valuable than the core innovation — as when 
videogame console producers deliberately lose money on the hardware so that they can make 
money from software royalties (Gallagher & Park, 2002). 
Both approaches — selling complements or providing incentives to attract them — provide 
examples of how firms use open innovation to complete their whole product solution (Figure 3). 
<insert Figure 3 about here> 
4.3.1 Selling Complements: Apache, KDE, Darwin 
In Teece’s (1986) conception, essential complements to a product include not only other 
products, but services to buyers and (often invisible) activities within the producer’s value chain. 
Linux distributors (such as Red Hat) that take freely available software and providing 
installation, training and support services would be selling complements to a free core product, 
as would the many other firms that sell services for “free” software.  Two open source examples 
of selling complements are IBM’s WebSphere and Apple’s Safari browser.   
Customers access IBM’s WebSphere e-commerce software using standard web browsers, so 
IBM originally developed a proprietary httpd (web page) server. IBM later abandoned its server 
for the Apache httpd server, rather than waste resources trying to catch up to the better quality 
and larger market share enjoyed by Apache (West, 2003). Today, IBM engineers participate in 
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the ongoing Apache innovation, both for the httpd server and also related projects hosted by the 
Apache Software Foundation. 
Similarly, in 2002 Apple Computer decided to build its own web browser to guarantee one 
would be available for its customers. The Safari browser  built upon libraries from the Konqueror 
web browser developed for the KDE open source desktop (Searls, 2003). Apple’s move 
paralleled its OS X strategy, where it created a new open source project (Darwin) to share its 
modifications of the BSD Unix code (West, 2003; Hawkins, 2004).2 For both Safari and OS X, 
Apple used open source and contributed back its changes, but the company did not release the 
remainder of the proprietary code for its browser and OS, respectively (Brockmeier, 2003). 
In the case of the Apache, Konqueror and Darwin open source projects, the firms adopting 
open source components had four common characteristics: 
• there was pre-existing open source code being developed without the intervention of 
the focal firms; 
• the “buy vs. build” decision to use external innovation was made easier because the 
code was “free”3; 
• the firms were willing to contribute back to the existing projects on an ongoing basis, 
to assure that the technology continued to meet their respective needs, to maintain 
absorptive capacity, and to avoid discouraging external innovators; 
                                                
2  After creating the Darwin open source project, Apple found the administrative overhead of allowing direct 
contributions and bug reporting was too great. However, the company monitors changes in the external 
OpenDarwin.org project, as well as in independent BSD projects such as FreeBSD (Prabhakar, 2005). 
3  Both Apache and BSD packages were open without restriction in the typology of West (2003), while KDE 
contained the compulsory sharing restrictions of the GPL. 
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• the firms could continue to yield returns for internal innovation by combining the 
internal and external technologies to make a product offering that was not directly 
available through open source. 
 
A more sophisticated version of selling complements is the “dual license” model, where 
firms such as MySQL or Trolltech create and sponsor an open source project with their own 
software, and continue to provide development resources to develop and improve that software.4 
These firms use a price discrimination (or “versioning”) strategy, consistent with Shapiro and 
Varian (1999): buyers who want free software get no support and restrictions on source code 
distribution in exchange for development feedback; less price sensitive buyers (e.g., 
corporations) pay the sponsoring firm a license fee to receive full features and support 
(Välimäki, 2003; West & O’Mahony, 2005).  In response to the success of MySQL — the most 
successful dual license software — from 2004-2006 Microsoft, Oracle and IBM announced free 
entry-level versions of their database software for entry level and evaluation purposes. 
4.3.2 Donated Complements: Avalanche, PC Game “Mods” 
In other cases, firms make their money off of the core innovation but seek donated labor for 
valuable complements.  This is nothing new, as such sharing dates to at least the 1950s, when 
IBM encouraged the establishment of users' groups, with the hope that pooling software 
development would alleviate both a programmer shortage and high custom software costs. The 
SHARE user group was established in 1955, and one year later it estimated it saved its 60 
members $1.5 million in in-house programming costs from one program alone (Campbell-Kelly, 
                                                
4  The third dual-license example cited by Välimäki (2003), Sleepycat Software, was purchased in February 2006 
by Oracle, MySQL’s largest proprietary competitor. 
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2003: 31-34).5  A contemporary version of this is the Avalanche Technology Cooperative, 
founded in 2001 to pool IT customizations developed by enterprise IT users that would allow 
companies to integrate disparate packages such as PeopleSoft and SAP (Lien and Black, 2004; 
Gomes, 2004). 
However, open source complements appear less common than open source core innovations. 
In interviews, vendors talk about the “customer facing” portion of a system providing the best 
opportunity for visible differentiation, so such innovation is more likely to be proprietary. 
Today, the PC game industry has a proven model, in which the game developer provides the 
core technology and some “customer facing” complements, while encouraging users to develop 
their own complements, known as game modifications (aka “mods”). To allow users to update 
and modify their games, publishers release editing tools for their games to encourage user mods; 
the users then freely distribute the mods on the Internet.  Frequently, this is followed up with the 
release of the core game itself under and open source license, as with Id Software’s Quake. 
A few of the mods are developed as open source, but most are not. While mods do not 
directly generate publisher revenues, the novelty of the mods extends the relatively short demand 
period for most computer games. Meanwhile, the mods keep the name of the game in front of 
consumers for additional months, while publishers prepare follow-on products, keeping the 
product current without tying up internal innovation resources. Perhaps the most successful 
example comes from Sierra, which released the Half-Life multi-player game as an “engine,” and 
Opposing Force as an alternate scenario using that engine. It attracted several donated “mods,” 
including Day of Defeat (which it later purchased), and “Counter-Strike,” which sold an 
estimated $40 million worth of games (Keighley, 2002). 
                                                
5  Distributing software as “public domain” (no copyright asserted) explicitly qualifies as an open source-
compatible license under rules of the Open Source Initiative. 
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A hybrid model of game modifications and open source comes with the popular multiplayer 
online game Quake. Id Software released successive GPL-licensed versions of the core Quake 
simulation engine from 2001-2005, with two goals in mind: first, to enable the creation of 
modifications and other enhancements by the gamer community. Second, Id generates licensing 
revenue from commercial game developers who (under the dual license strategy) pay for the 
rights to distribute their commercial Quake-derived game. 
As with open source, a key issue for mods is motivating contributors. The motivations 
parallel those for open source: direct utility, intrinsic reward or external signaling. Individuals (or 
virtual teams) contribute mods because of their creative nature, love of either the computer game 
they modified or the milieu they recreated via their mod (Todd, 2004). Students are also frequent 
contributors, increasing their enjoyment of a favorite game (direct utility) as well as signaling 
their value to potential employers. While not pure open source software, the computer game 
makers have adopted some specific practices to motivate IP contributions: 
• Minimizing technical obstacles. Contributors develop mods because they can build 
upon the publisher’s proprietary innovation to make a compelling game experience. 
As with other software development platforms, third party developers are attracted by 
platform capabilities and the prompt availability of development tools. 
• Creating an infrastructure that encourages participation and collaboration. For open 
source, this is a project website and e-mail lists, but for mods this is a site to 
highlights the mods. Modern technologies make the cost of such infrastructure quite 
low and accessible to global contributors around the world. 
• Recognition for contributors, including added visibility for the most popular creators. 
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However, mods also address a problem very different from those of business-oriented open 
source projects. As with other entertainment products, novelty-seeking consumers eventually 
grow bored with a PC game so by combining the core game engine with new externally 
generated game scenarios, the external innovation extends the life of the core (internally 
developed) innovation. 
5. DISCUSSION 
Open source software highlights many ways firms can enhance their competitive advantage 
by using the ideas of open innovation. However, the case of open source seems particularly 
paradoxical, in that a key part of the customer offering is inherently “free.” Here we have shown 
how firms are able to create value (and revenue) from their IP over and above that which was 
given away “free.” 
5.1 Open Innovation in I.T. Industries 
Firms have long faced concerns on how to obtain returns to innovation, particularly when 
they lack the resources to fully exploit or appropriate the returns (Teece, 1986).  The open 
innovation framework helps explain how firms have used the rise of open source software to 
develop new forms of innovation strategies. The use of open source by firms typically begins in 
ways that does not disrupt their fundamental business model (e.g. selling complements), or 
comes at a time when their existing business model is so threatened that they are forced them to 
make drastic changes.  We identified four open innovation strategies software firms used in order 
to exploit internal and external innovation.  Each of these four strategies addresses the three open 
innovation challenges (Table 4). 
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How did firms maximize the returns to their internal IP?  Consistent with absorptive capacity 
arguments, in each case the firms were required to posses some level of IP either to enable them 
to target a high value portion of the market (selling complements) or to enable them to trade with 
other firms (pooled R&D) or lay the foundation for others to contribute to the project (Spinouts 
& Donated Complements).  Effective open innovation does not eliminate the need for an internal 
stock of IP, but instead integrates it throughout the firm so additional opportunities can be 
identified and exploited. 
<insert table 4 about here> 
How did firms integrate the external IP into their organization?  Sometimes integration is 
explicitly planned for as it is under the pooled R&D strategy.  However, firms face risks from 
collaborating, such as when the pooled R&D supporting a common Linux platform 
commoditized the existing Unix systems market and reduced barriers to entry (West & Dedrick, 
2001). 
What motivates external sources of IP? Occasionally firms can simply rely upon the 
dedication of novices or well meaning individuals to make IP contributions (pooled R&D, 
donated complements). For example, by pooling changes from its Darwin project with other 
open source projects such as FreeBSD, NetBSD and OpenBSD; Apple both contributes and 
receives IP as part of a pooled R&D strategy.  In other cases, commercialization often requires 
either a significant up front contribution (spinouts) or a more ongoing level of support and 
coordination of the efforts (selling complements) by firms.   
Consistent with the Almeida et al (2003) finding that larger firms are more likely to build on 
external knowledge, in our study the large IT firms with a broad scope of products became 
involved in open source because they could not ignore any significant source of external 
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innovation available to rivals. Among smaller firms, some aligned their innovation strategies 
with open source, while others sought niches unaffected by open source competition. 
5.2 Implications for Other Industries 
The four patterns of combining internal and external innovation in open source could be 
applied to more general forms of open innovation: 
• Pooled R&D. As with other consortia, firms leveraging open source often need to 
change corporate culture to realize the benefits of shared R&D. An open culture is 
essential to accept external innovations, overcome “not invented here” biases and 
build trust between firms (Santoro & Chakrabarti, 2001; Chesbrough, 2003a; 
Nakamura et al, 1997). For example, Novell acquired Ximian, an open source startup, 
to transform its internal culture to become more outwardly focused to work better 
with external open source projects (Freedman 2004). 
• Spinouts. Since spinouts are valuable for technologies locked in the laboratory, they 
are most relevant to the largest firms, which both have the largest innovation budgets 
and also the largest bureaucracies to defeat commercialization. While Xerox PARC 
has exemplified such obstacles, in some cases Xerox spun out the technology and 
participated financially in its commercialization (Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 
2002). 
• Selling complements. For industry segments where firms previously succeeded 
through innovation-based product differentiation, firms face a choice of accepting 
commoditization or (consistent with Henderson and Clark, 1990) developing 
architectural innovation capabilities to develop differentiated products using 
commodity components. 
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• Donated complements. These match what von Hippel and Katz (2002) call “user 
toolkits,” where general purpose technologies are sold to users capable of generating 
their own modifications and improvements. Such strategies are most feasible when 
selling to technically proficient buyers, whether corporate engineers or hobbyist-
programmers. 
A key problem for open innovation is that firms integrating internal and external innovations 
can face higher coordination costs and risks than if all activities were internalized; the firms in 
our sample relying on open source external innovations faced both these costs and risks. Of the 
two types of open source projects identified by West & O’Mahony (2005), the firm-sponsored 
projects forced the sponsoring firm to bear the preponderance of coordination costs; for 
community-led projects, firms faced lower coordination costs but higher potential risks. 
Open source software as part of corporate open innovation strategies is still a comparatively 
recent phenomenon, and there are some unresolved issues. Open source built on a confluence of 
ideology, professional norms and enthusiasm, which may or may not be sustained as it becomes 
more commercialized. Also, many projects have been created as challenges to an entrenched 
incumbent (e.g. Microsoft), and if such challenges are largely unsuccessful, vendor interest in 
sponsoring future open source efforts could wane. 
A final challenge for managers that may arise in other industries that open source has yet to 
resolve are IP issues of accepting donations from a wide community of unknown contributors.  
What happens if a user inadvertently contributes proprietary IP to an open source project?  Such 
a case is exemplified by SCO’s lawsuit accusing Linux contributors of stealing copyrighted 
source code from SCO’s proprietary Unix implementation.  Others have suggested that 
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proprietary “stealth” IP could be deliberately donated to open source projects to sabotage those 
projects (Cargill & Bolin, 2004). 
5.3 Further Research 
This analysis of open source software provides further evidence that open innovation 
provides opportunities for firms to concentrate their R&D efforts on a small fraction of the 
“whole product” solution. At the same time, it raises other questions about defining what is 
common to the practice of open innovation. 
There is a huge gap between free-riding on basic research (e.g. Chesbrough, 2003b) and this 
study of the deliberate partitioning of software development between firms and open source 
projects. What do these two open innovation extremes have in common? Examples might 
include virtual teams, cultural openness, technological modularization and public/private 
collaboration. At the same time, what other options are there between relying on free spillovers 
and coordinating a complex production ecosystem? 
We obviously believe that there are useful lessons for all industries from the four open 
innovation strategies we’ve suggested here.  However, there remain important considerations for 
attempting to take open innovation to other industries.  For example, many firms still profitably 
engage in internal R&D and use the proprietary R&D model.  Does this happen only in cases 
where (as Teece 1986 predicts) firms can appropriate the returns from their innovations?  There 
also remain importance considerations around process innovations.  Is open innovation as 
powerful a framework for process as it is product innovative activity? 
Other concerns center around our question of motivating innovations.  University research 
spawned key open source projects such as BSD, Python and sendmail. Recently, universities 
have increasingly sought to profit from their research spillovers, a trend encouraged in the U.S. 
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by the Bayh-Dole Act (Colyvas et al, 2002). This might restrict the flow of external innovations; 
conversely, it could increase the incentive for an ongoing supply of them, albeit at a higher cost 
for open innovators.  Simultaneously, increasing conflict over patents may be an issue for firms 
as patent litigation severely affects those without defensive patents (e.g. Jaffe & Lerner, 2004).  
This raises an interesting issue.  Do firms require a portfolio of legally protected IP, i.e. patents, 
in addition to absorptive capacity in order to exploit (or continue to exploit) open innovation? 
Finally, the software industry reflects an industry with a high percentage of revenues spent 
on development (if not research). However, many firms in other industries have a lower R&D 
intensity and lower rate of internal innovation, either due to firm characteristics (lack of scale 
economies) or industry characteristics (low technology industries). Are such firms pursuing 
“external innovation,” “open innovation,” or (as commonly assumed) “no innovation” strategies? 
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7. FIGURES AND TABLES 
Innovation Model Management Challenges Resulting Management Techniques 
Proprietary 
(or internal or 
“closed”) 
1. Attracting “best & brightest” 
2. Moving research results to 
development 
1. Provide excellent compensation, 
resources, and freedom. 
2. Provide dedicated development 
functions to exploit research and 
link it to market knowledge. 
External 1. Exploring a wide range of 
sources for innovation. 
2. Integrate external knowledge 
with firm resources & 
capabilities 
1. Careful environmental scanning 
2. Developing absorptive capacity, 
and/or using alliances, networks, and 
related consortia. 
Open 1. Motivating the generation & 
contribution of external 
knowledge (motivating) 
2. Integrating those sources with 
firm resources & capabilities 
(incorporating) 
3. Diversifying the exploitation 
of IP resources (maximizing) 
1. Provide intrinsic rewards (e.g. 
recognition) and structure 
(instrumentality) for contributions. 
2. As above. 
3. Share or give away IP to maximize 
returns from entire innovation 
portfolio. 
Table 1: Models of Innovation and Resulting Managerial Issues 
Project Founded† Founders Product Category Commercialization 
Apache 1995 8 webmasters web server shared R&D 
Darwin 1999 Apple operating system selling complements 
Eclipse 2001 IBM programming 
environment 
spinout 
Jikes 1998 IBM Java compiler spinout 
Konqueror 2000 KDE project web browser selling complements 
Linux 1991 L. Torvalds operating system shared R&D 
Mozilla 1998 Netscape web browser spinout, shared R&D 
MySQL 1995 M. Widenius 
& D. Axmark 
database selling complements 
OpenOffice 2000 Sun business productivity selling complements 
Sendmail 1983 U.C. Berkeley mail router selling complements 
† Date of open source project founding or source code release, whichever is earlier 
Table 2: Open source projects with commercial applications leading to open innovation 
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Category Companies Motivation 
Computer systems 
vendor 
Dell, Fujitsu, Hitachi, HP, IBM, 
NEC, Sun 
Replacing proprietary Unix in 
computers with shared Linux 
Telecommunications 
vendor 
Alcatel, Cisco, Ericsson, NEC, 
Nokia, NTT, Toshiba 
Replacing proprietary Unix with 
Linux in telecom equipment 
Microprocessor 
producer AMD, Intel, Transmeta Enter Unix market using Linux 
Linux distributor 
(server and 
desktop) 
Miracle Linux, NEC Soft, Novell, 
Red Hat, SuSE, Turbolinux Sell Linux distributions and services 
Embedded Linux 
distributor 
LynuxWorks, MontaVista, 
TimeSys, Wind River 
Design Linux into custom products 
for customers 
Linux support 
company 
VA Software, Linuxcare, 
LynuxWorks Sell Linux services 
Software developers Computer Associates, Trolltech Adapt proprietary applications to Linux  
 
Founding member in bold 
Source: “OSDL Members,” OSDL and company websites (as of mid-2004) 
Table 3: Members of the Open Source Development Labs 
Open Source 
Strategy Example 
Maximizing Returns 
of Internal Innovation 
Role of External 
Innovation 
Motivating External 
Innovation 
Pooled R&D 
/Product 
Development 
Linux Participants jointly 
contribute to shared 
effort 
Pooled contributions 
available to all 
Ongoing institutions 
establish legitimacy and 
continuity 
Spinouts Eclipse Seed non-commercial 
technology to support 
other goals 
Supplants internal 
innovation as basis of 
ongoing innovation 
Free access to valuable 
technology 
Selling 
Complements 
Apache Target highest value 
part of whole product 
solution 
External components 
provide basis for 
internal development 
Firms coordinate 
ongoing supply of 
components 
Donated 
Complements 
Half-Life Provide an extensible 
platform for external 
contributors 
Adding variety and 
novelty to established 
products 
Recognition and other 
non-monetary rewards 
Table4: Open source strategies as solutions to open innovation challenges 
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Figure 1: Motivating, integrating and exploiting innovation 
 
Figure 2: Knowledge flows in three software R&D models 
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Figure 3: Open innovation to complete whole product solution 
